XI.M25 (NUREG-1801 R0)

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XI.M25 BWR REACTOR WATER CLEANUP SYSTEM

Program Description

The program includes inservice inspection (ISI) and monitoring and control of reactor coolant water chemistry to manage the effects of stress corrosion cracking (SCC) or intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC) on the intended function of austenitic stainless steel (SS) piping in the reactor water cleanup (RWCU) system. Based on the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (US NRC) criteria related to inspection guidelines for RWCU piping welds outboard of the second isolation valve, the program includes the measures delineated in NUREG-0313, Rev. 2, and US NRC Generic Letter (GL) 88-01. Coolant water chemistry is monitored and maintained in accordance with the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) guidelines in boiling water reactor vessel and internals project (BWRVIP)-29 (TR-103515(Archived)) to minimize the potential of crack initiation and growth due to SCC or IGSCC.


Evaluation and Technical Basis

1. Scope of Program: Based on the US NRC letter (September 15, 1995) on the screening criteria related to inspection guidelines for RWCU piping welds outboard of the second isolation valve, the program includes the measures delineated in NUREG-0313, Rev. 2, and US NRC GL 88-01 to monitor SCC or IGSCC and its effects on the intended function of austenitic SS piping. The screening criteria include:
  1. Satisfactory completion of all actions requested in US NRC GL 89-10,
  2. No detection of IGSCC in RWCU welds inboard of the second isolation valves (ongoing inspection in accordance with the guidance in US NRC GL 88-01), and
  3. No detection of IGSCC in RWCU welds outboard of the second isolation valves after inspecting a minimum of 10% of the susceptible piping.
No IGSCC inspection is recommended for plants that meet all three criteria or that meet criterion (a) and piping is made of material that is resistant to IGSCC.
2. Preventive Actions: The comprehensive program outlined in NUREG-0313, and US NRC GL 88-01 addresses improvements in all three elements that, in combination, cause SCC or IGSCC. These elements are a susceptible (sensitized) material, a significant tensile stress, and an aggressive environment. The program delineated in NUREG-0313, and US NRC GL 88-01 includes recommendations regarding selection of materials that are resistant to sensitization, use of special processes that reduce residual tensile stresses, and monitoring and maintenance of coolant chemistry. The resistant materials are used for new and replacement components and include low-carbon grades of austenitic SS and weld metal, with a maximum carbon of 0.035 wt.% and a minimum ferrite of 7.5% in weld metal and cast austenitic stainless steel (CASS). Inconel 82 is the only commonly used nickel-base weld metal considered to be resistant to SCC; other nickel-alloys, such as Alloy 600, are evaluated on an individual basis. Special processes are used for existing as well as new and replacement components. These processes include solution heat treatment, heat sink welding, induction heating, and mechanical stress improvement.
The program delineated in NUREG-0313, and US NRC GL 88-01 varies depending on the plant-specific reactor water chemistry to mitigate SCC or IGSCC.
3. Parameters Monitored/Inspected: The aging management program (AMP) monitors SCC or IGSCC of austenitic SS piping by detection and sizing of cracks by implementing the inspection guidelines delineated in the US NRC screening criteria for the RWCU piping outboard of isolation valves. The following schedules are followed:
Schedule A: No inspection is required for plants that meet all three criteria set forth above, or if they meet only criterion (a). Piping is made of material that is resistant to IGSCC, as described above in preventive actions.
Schedule B: For plants that meet only criterion (a): Inspect at least 2% of the welds or two welds every refueling outage, whichever sample is larger.
Schedule C: For plants that do not meet criterion (a): Inspect at least 10% of the welds every refueling outage.
4. Detection of Aging Effects: The extent, method, and schedule of the inspection and test techniques delineated in the US NRC inspection criteria for RWCU piping and US NRC GL 88-01 are designed to maintain structural integrity and to detect aging effects before the loss of intended function of austenitic SS piping and fittings. Guidelines for the inspection schedule, methods, personnel, sample expansion, and leak detection guidelines are based on the guidelines of US NRC GL 88-01.
The US NRC GL 88-01 recommends that the detailed inspection procedure, equipment, and examination personnel be qualified by a formal program approved by the US NRC. Inspection can reveal crack initiation and growth and leakage of coolant. The extent and frequency of inspections recommended by the program are based on the condition of each weld (e.g., whether the weldments were made from IGSCC-resistant material, whether a stress improvement process was applied to a weldment to reduce the residual stresses, and how the weld was repaired if it had been cracked).
5. Monitoring and Trending: The extent and schedule for inspection in accordance with the recommendations of US NRC GL 88-01 provide timely detection of cracks and leakage of coolant. Based on inspection results, US NRC GL 88-01 provides guidelines for additional samples of welds to be inspected when one or more cracked welds are found in a weld category.
6. Acceptance Criteria: The US NRC GL 88-01 recommends that any indication detected be evaluated in accordance with the requirements of ASME Section Xl, Subsection IWB-3640 (1995 edition through the 1996 addenda).
7. Corrective Actions: The guidance for weld overlay repair, stress improvement, or replacement is provided in US NRC GL 88-01. As discussed in the appendix to this report, the staff finds the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, acceptable in addressing corrective actions.
8. Confirmation Process: Site quality assurance (QA) procedures, review and approval processes, and administrative controls are implemented in accordance with requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B. As discussed in the appendix to this report, the staff finds the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, acceptable in addressing the confirmation process and administrative controls.
9. Administrative Controls: See Item 8, above.
10. Operating Experience: The IGSCC has occurred in small- and large-diameter boiling water reactor (BWR) piping made of austenitic SSs or nickel alloys. The comprehensive program outlined in US NRC GL 88-01 and NUREG-0313 addresses improvements in all elements that cause SCC or IGSCC (e.g., susceptible material, significant tensile stress, and an aggressive environment) and is effective in managing IGSCC in austenitic SS piping in the RWCU system.


References

ASME Section XI, Rules for Inservice Inspection of Nuclear Power Plant Components, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, 1995 edition through the 1996 addenda, American Society of Mechanical Engineers, New York, NY.

BWRVIP-29 (EPRI TR-103515(Archived)), BWR Vessel and Internals Project, BWR Water Chemistry Guidelines-1993 Revision, Normal and Hydrogen Water Chemistry, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, February 1994.

Letter from Joseph W. Shea, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, to George A. Hunter, Jr., PECO Energy Company, Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System Weld Inspections at Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3 (TAC Nos. M92442 and M92443), September 15, 1995.

US NRC Generic Letter 88-01, US NRC Position on IGSCC in BWR Austenitic Stainless Steel Piping, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, January 25, 1988.

NUREG-0313, Rev. 2, Technical Report on Material Selection and Processing Guidelines for BWR Coolant Pressure Boundary Piping, W. S. Hazelton and W. H. Koo, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1988.